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This paper explores motivational foundations 
of identity formation and their implications for 
individualism in economic decision making. 
The underlying idea is simple. Identity for-
mation partitions our social space into in- and 
 out-groups. Our motivations differ across these 
groups. We tend to be more prosocially coop-
erative with our  in-groups and more position-
ally competitive with our  out-groups. We form 
our in- and  out-groups by trading off prosocial 
cooperation against positional competition. 
The size of our  in-groups reflects our degree of 
individualism.
In this context, we examine the economic con-
sequences of technological progress. Positional 
competition usually rests more heavily on 
market activities than does prosocial coopera-
tion. Technological progress, falling mainly on 
market activities, changes our balance between 
positional competition and prosocial cooper-
ation, thereby leading to a restructuring of our 
identities.
Our analysis sheds light on economic causes 
and consequences of three  well-documented 
phenomena in market economies: the rise of 
individualism (“bowling alone”),1 the rise of 
positional competition, and increasing scope of 
economic markets in organizing the production 
and distribution of goods (the “commercializa-
tion of life”). We examine the welfare effects of 
these developments.
1 See Putnam (2000). Empirical evidence on these and 
related phenomena, along with formal derivations of the 
results below, are given in Snower and Bosworth (2015). 
I. Underlying Ideas
In accordance with the literature on motiva-
tion psychology, we recognize that people can 
be affected by multiple, discrete motives, each 
of which is understood as a force that gives 
direction and energy to one’s behavior, thereby 
determining the objective of the behavior. This 
recognition differs markedly from standard neo-
classical and behavioral economics, where each 
individual is assumed to have a unique set of 
preferences that are internally consistent, tempo-
rally stable, and  context-independent. Our anal-
ysis, by contrast, recognizes that an individual’s 
objectives depend on which motives are active, 
and the activation of motives is influenced by the 
individual’s social context. Thus, preferences in 
our analysis are not located exclusively in the 
individual, but rather are the outcome of the 
interplay between the individual and the social 
environment. Individuals are  multidirected, in 
the sense that different environmental cues may 
give rise to different motives, associated with 
different objectives of decision making.2
Our analysis considers three motives: (i) Care 
with regard to  in-group members, whereby an 
individual’s utility depends positively on the 
payoff of others; (ii)  Status-seeking with regard 
to  out-group members, whereby an individual’s 
utility depends on the difference between her 
payoff and that of others; and (iii)  Self-interested 
wanting, whereby an individual’s utility depends 
on her own payoff. This is a simplification; in 
practice, there are of course further motives rel-
evant for economic decisions. For example, in 
the foundational models of identity economics (summarized in Akerlof and Kranton 2010), 
people’s  in-group behavior is governed by social 
2 A survey of psychological motives underlying eco-
nomic decisions, their biological substrates, and an account 
of  multidirectedness are given in Przyrembel et al. (2015). 
Implications of  multidirectedness for economic activity are 
explored in Bosworth, Singer, and Snower (forthcoming). 
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categories, associated with distinctive norms 
and ideals, promoted by the motive of affilia-
tion.3 Furthermore, people’s  out-group behavior 
may be driven by the motives of fear or anger, 
not just status-seeking.
The motives that our analysis focuses on—
care,  status-seeking, and  self-interest—are 
associated with three activities: prosociality, 
positional competition, and  self-interestedness, 
respectively. These activities generate three out-
puts: caring relationships, positional goods, and 
 nonpositional goods, respectively.
The utility from  in-groups is generated through 
the production of caring relationships, which 
may be understood as a club good, shared by 
 in-group members. The utility from  out-groups 
arises from the production of positional goods, 
conferring status. People’s performance in posi-
tional competition depends on their differing 
abilities, defined in terms of goods produced per 
unit of effort. Superior positional performance 
generates pride (a utility gain) and inferior per-
formance generates envy (a utility loss).
For simplicity, we assume that each indi-
vidual has a single identity, associated with a 
single  in-group, regarding whose members the 
person is motivated by care. Those who are not 
members of this  in-group belong to the corre-
sponding  out-group, toward whom the person 
is motivated by  status-seeking.4 The size of the 
individual’s in- and  out-group depends on the 
trade-off between the benefit from caring rela-
tionships and the net benefit from status.
We will examine how technological progress 
affects this trade-off, promoting  status-seeking 
at the expense of care.5 Since status-seeking 
3 While affiliation coordinates the actions of  in-group 
members through adherence to norms and ideals, care is a 
 welfare-driven coordination device. 
4 These assumptions are of course radical simplifica-
tions. In practice, individuals generally belong to several 
 in-groups. Furthermore,  in-group relations are often moti-
vated by more than care and  out-group relations by more 
than  status-seeking. For example, rivalries among  in-group 
members are common, and  out-group members often evoke 
indifference. Nevertheless,  in-group relations are usually 
more caring than  out-group relations and have more strin-
gent constraints on positional competition. 
5 The empirical evidence on the rise of positional com-
petition relative to care points to various other forces that 
lie beyond the scope of this analysis, such as the role of 
 advertising in raising the salience of positional goals, the 
crowding out of caring activities through time, and cognitive 
load devoted to positional battles, etc. 
generates negative externalities while care cre-
ates positive ones, these developments have 
important welfare implications.
II. Cooperation versus Competition
We now construct a simple model of 
 care-driven cooperation and  status-driven 
competition.
A.  Nonmarket Activity
Each individual  i contributes  q i to her 
 nonmarketable club good (caring relation-
ships) in each period of analysis. The produc-
tion function is  q i = α e i , where  e i is effort. 
For simplicity, let the individual provide one 
unit of effort ( e i = 1 ). The total amount of the 
club good available to each  in-group member is 
 Q =  ∑ i  q i =  N i  q i , where  N i is the size of 
individual  i ’s  in-group. Individual  i ’s payoff is 
 U  i 
q = Q −  e i . Under perfect care (whereby the 
individual’s utility is weighted equally with that 
of the other group members), the individual’s 
utility is  U i 
c =  1 _  N i ( U i q +  ∑ j≠i  U j q ) .
B. Market Activity
Each individual  i produces  x i market goods. 
The production function is  x i = β a i  η i , where 
 a i is the individual’s ability (higher  a i stands 
for higher ability),  η i is effort, and  β is a pos-
itive productivity parameter. Again, the indi-
vidual is assumed to provide one unit of effort ( η i = 1 ). Ability is uniformly distributed. For 
a group containing individual  i , the ability of 
its  lowest-ranked member is  a _i and that of its 
 highest-ranked member is  
_
 a i . Thus, the size of 
the  in-group is  N i =  _ a i −  a _i .
For the  x i market goods produced by individ-
ual  i ,  γ  x i are  nonpositional and  (1 − γ)  x i are 
positional, where  γ is a constant ( 0 < γ < 1 ). 
The individual’s utility from the  nonpositional 
good is  U i 
n = γ  x i .
In each period of analysis she also competes 
with a random member from her  out-group. 
Her utility from positional competition with the 
outsider  j is  U i, j 
s ≡ π max ( x i −  x j , 0)  − ε max 
( x j −  x i , 0) , where  π is a pride parameter and ε is an envy parameter. Her expected util-
ity from competing with a random outsider is 
 ( a _i  U i  s _  +  (1 −  _ a i )  U i  
_
 s  ) , where  a _i is the 
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 probability of encountering an  inferior-ability 
outsider and  U i 
 s _  is  i ’s  pride-driven utility from 
this encounter, whereas  (1 −  _ a i ) is the proba-
bility of encountering a  superior-ability out-
sider and  U i 
 s _  is  i ’s  envy-driven utility from that 
encounter.
C. Group Size
In each period of analysis she encounters 
in- and  out-group members with probabilities 
proportional to the number of in- and  out-group 
members, respectively. The proportionality fac-
tors are  A and  (1 − A) , respectively, measuring 
the degree of assortative matching.6 Letting  θ 
be the weighting of positional utility relative to 
caring utility, the expected utility of individual  i 
is  U i =  (1 − θ) A U i c + θ (1 − A) E ( U i, j s ) +  U i n .
All individuals seek to join the  highest-ranking 
group that will accept them, as  U i is increasing 
in  
_
 a i . Since the  highest-ability member of each 
group has the greatest incentive to leave the group 
with a subset of group members who would will-
ingly follow, the lower boundary of each group 
maximizes the utility of this  highest-ranking 
member. When the  lowest-ability members are 
successively expelled and the lower bound  a _
rises, there is a progressively larger fall in the 
 highest-ability member’s utility from caring 
relationships and a progressively smaller rise 
in the  highest-ability member’s  pride-driven 
utility from status competition. At the margin, 
expelling the  lowest-ability group member 
leads to a fall in the  highest-ability member’s 
utility from caring relationships that is exactly 
equal to the rise in the member’s  pride-driven 
utility from competition. Accordingly, it can be 
shown that, for group  k with upper bound  
_
 a k , 
the  utility-maximizing group size is
(1) N * =  _ a k −  a _ k ∗ =  Aα (1 − θ)   _______________  βπθ (1 − A)  (1 − γ) . 
The upper bound of the  highest-ability group 
is the upper bound of the ability distribution. 
The size of each group may be derived recur-
sively, moving down the ability ladder.
6  A = 1/2 represents random matching and  A = 1 stands 
for extreme  in-group matching bias. 
In this context, we now consider the impli-
cations of technological progress for economic 
activities and welfare. A technological advance 
in the production of the market good is repre-
sented by a rise in the productivity parameter β . Note that  ∂  N ∗ /∂ β < 0 , i.e., a rise in pro-
ductivity reduces the size of social groups and 
increases the scope of positional competition. 
By increasing the productivity of engaging in 
positional competition, it induces individuals 
to substitute status relationships for caring rela-
tionships by reducing the extent of their  in-group 
identification.
On account of the forces of habit, cultural 
transmission, and loss aversion, the wider scope 
of positional competition may be expected to lead 
to a heavier weighting (rising  θ ) of positional util-
ity relative to caring utility in people’s expected 
utility functions. This also leads to a reduction 
in the size of  in-groups since:  ∂  N ∗ /∂ θ < 0 . 
Furthermore, increased positional competition 
may also lead to an increased sensitivity to the 
gains from such competition (rising  π ), which 
also leads smaller  in-groups and more positional 
competition since:  ∂  N ∗ /∂ π < 0 .
The three developments above—smaller 
 in-groups, less value placed on caring rela-
tionships relative to status relationships, and 
increased sensitivity to gains from status—are 
different aspects of increased individualism.
III. Implications
Over the past 350 years there has been an 
unprecedented explosion in material living 
standards, much of it driven by technological 
advances in the design, production, and distri-
bution of goods and services. These advances 
have fallen primarily on market activities, rather 
than  nonmarket activities associated with caring 
relationships. The reason is akin to the “Baumol 
effect”: caring relationships with one’s spouse 
and children, for example, require similar time 
and effort nowadays as they did a century ago, 
whereas the production of goods and services 
has seen huge  technology-driven productivity 
improvements.
Caring relationships tend to be associated 
with  nonmarket activities. Although these 
 relationships may involve marketable goods and 
services, the latter are incidental rather than cen-
tral to these relationships. In fact, caring rela-
tionships need to be driven by intrinsic motives 
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that tend to be displaced by the extrinsic motives 
of market activities. By contrast, positional con-
tests tend to center on marketable goods and 
services, whose values can be measured and 
compared.
In our model, positional and  nonpositional 
goods are assumed to benefit proportionally 
from technological progress. This is a conserva-
tive assumption, since the evidence suggests that 
positional goods benefit more than  nonpositional 
goods, since demand for the former is less satia-
ble than demand for the latter. In any case, we 
observe that technological progress favors posi-
tional goods relative to caring relationships. Our 
model shows how such technological progress 
leads to a progressively larger proportion of 
market goods and services to be devoted to sta-
tus wants (such as sports cars, designer clothing, 
and luxury cruises). At the same time, our model 
accounts for a  well-documented rise in individ-
ualism, in the sense of a contraction in one’s 
circle of social solidarity (as illustrated by the 
fragmentation of family structures and a rise in 
contractual relative to communal relationships).
What are the welfare implications of 
 technology-driven economic growth, accom-
panied by a growing quest for status, whereby 
people can gain only at each other’s expense? 
The developments above—increases in 
 market-based productivity ( β ), weighting of 
positional relative to caring utility ( θ ), and sen-
sitivity to gains from positional competition ( π )—may be summarized by the shift parameter 
y = f  (β, θ, π) . The welfare implications may be 
assessed in terms of the social welfare function 
W =  ∑ k  ∫  a _k   _ a k    U i d a i , i.e., the sum of the utilities 
of all groups:
 dW ___
dy
 =  ∂W ___∂y +  ∑ k 
 
  ( ∂W ___∂ _ ak ·  
d ¯  a k  ___
dy
 +  ∂W ____∂ a _k ·  
d a _k  ___
dy
 ) .
The first term is the direct welfare effect, which 
is conventional; the second term is the indirect 
effect, which may be decomposed into the effect 
of increased individualization (smaller social 
groups) on the welfare from caring relationships 
and positional competition.
Obviously, social welfare from caring rela-
tionships declines, because as  in-groups shrink, 
the production of caring relationships falls. 
What about welfare from increased positional 
competition?
The process of individualization leads to a 
cascade of social demotions down the ladder of 
status, starting with a shrinking  top-status group 
and rippling down to the progressively shrinking 
 lower-status groups. Each step in the individu-
alization process generates demotees (who are 
relegated to the  next-lower social position) and 
remaining incumbents (who maintain their pre-
vious social position).
In our analysis, each social group is of equal 
size, comprising the incumbents and demotees 
from a  higher-status group. As noted, people 
are envious of  higher-status groups and proud 
regarding  lower-status groups, but they expe-
rience neither pride nor envy regarding mem-
bers of their own social group. For simplicity, 
we assume that the utility of pride is linear and 
homogeneous across social groups (given by 
parameter  π ) and similarly for the disutility 
of envy (given by parameter  ε ). Under these 
assumptions, it can be shown that the compar-
ative static changes in envy and pride obey the 
following conditions:
 (i) Envy Condition.—Demotees become 
envious of the group from which they 
have been expelled, and incumbents 
cease to be envious of the demotees who 
have joined them. It can be shown that 
the demotees’ increased envy is greater 
than the incumbents’ reduced envy. The 
reason is that increased individualiza-
tion leads to fewer incumbents and more 
demotees.
 (ii) Pride Condition.—Demotees cease to 
experience pride regarding the incum-
bents they have joined, and incumbents 
become proud with regard to the demo-
tees that have been expelled from their 
group. It can be shown that the demo-
tee’s welfare losses associated with 
reduced pride exceed the incumbents’ 
welfare gains from increased pride. The 
reason is that for each social group, only 
the  highest-status incumbent is indif-
ferent between the pride gained from 
more individualization (expulsion of 
the marginal  in-group member) and the 
associated care lost from fewer caring 
relationships. For all other incumbents in 
the social group, the pride gained is less 
than the care lost. In addition,  demotees 
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are worse off on account of their lost 
pride.7
The overall welfare implications are clear. 
The exogenous developments above—the 
technological advance (a rise in  β ), heavier 
weighting of positional utility (a rise in  θ ), and 
increased sensitivity to competitive gains (a rise 
in  π )—have standard direct effects, but their 
indirect effects via increased individualization 
are negative. The unambiguous welfare loss 
from individualization arises from the deterio-
ration of caring relationships and the deterio-
ration of the position of the residual demotees. 
This result runs counter to the conventional 
wisdom that increased positional competition 
leaves social welfare unchanged, provided that 
the gains from pride are equal to the losses from 
envy and the resource cost of positional compe-
tition is ignored.8
Beyond the scope of the model above, the 
rising demand for positional goods may be 
expected to promote incentives for further inno-
vation in the production of these goods, leading 
to another round of increased individualism. 
This chain reaction of effects may be called the 
“ innovation-individualization multiplier,” which 
may drive a process of endogenous growth.
Our analysis sheds light on how identity 
formation strikes a balance between prosocial 
cooperation and positional competition. It also 
explains how technological progress may affect 
7 These conditions are derived formally in Snower and 
Bosworth (2015). 
8 Whereas our analysis highlights important sources of 
welfare losses from individualization, it is of course worth 
noting that our simplified model also overlooks potentially 
important welfare gains from individualization (such as pos-
sible utility from an increased sense of agency or from an 
increased impetus for creativity and innovation). 
this balance, by promoting individualization, 
positional competition at the expense of care, 
and market activities at the expense of  nonmarket 
ones. In this context, the standard positive direct 
effects of technological progress may be miti-
gated by negative indirect effects arising from 
diminished prosociality and increased positional 
competitiveness.
REFERENCES
Akerlof, George A., and Rachel E. Kranton. 2010. 
Identity Economics: How Our Identities Shape 
Our Work, Wages, and Well-Being. Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press.
Bosworth, Steven J., Tania Singer, and Dennis J. 
Snower. Forthcoming. “Cooperation, Moti-
vation, and Social Balance.” Journal of Eco-
nomic Behavior and Organization.
Przyrembel, Marisa, Gabriele Chierchia, Steven J. 
Bosworth, Dennis J. Snower, and Tania Singer. 
2015. “Beyond Approach and Avoidance: 
Towards a Motivation-Based Decision Making 
Model.” Unpublished. 
Putnam, Robert D. 2000. Bowling Alone: The 
Collapse and Revival of American Community. 
Chicago: Simon and Schuster.
Snower, Dennis J., and Steven J. Bosworth. 2015. 
“Identity-driven Cooperation versus Compe-
tition.” Kiel Institute for the World Economy 
Discussion Paper 2017.
